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Abstract
Frege’s criticism of psychologism evolved over time. The main point of this 
evolution is the passage from the criticism of psychologism in the “Foundations 
of arithmetic” to that of the “Basic laws of arithmetic”. The determining role 
in this passage is played by the criticism Frege received from Kerry.
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Resumo
A crítica de Frege ao psicologismo evoluiu ao longo do tempo. O ponto principal 
desta evolução é a passagem da crítica do psicologismo em “Fundamentos da 
aritmética” àquela das “Leis básicas da aritmética”. O papel determinante nesta 
passagem se dá a partir da crítica que Frege recebeu de Kerry.
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Introduction
In this paper I will defend two theses that, although independent in principle, 
can indeed be thought of as connected to each other:
(a) The standard reading claims that Frege’s critique of psychologism is an 
indivisible whole, usually – and carelessly – quoting numerous passages of Frege’s 
texts from different periods. However, even though it is correct to say that the criti-
cism of psychologism is a constant in Frege’s work, one must notice that it went 
through a number of changes in the course of time, making it plausible to argue 
that there is an evolution in this criticism.
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(b) The standard account of Frege usually treats his criticism of psychologism 
as a one-way street, thereby losing sight of its controversial character. The story 
is frequently told as if Frege had “put the psychologistic logicians back in their 
place” and as if the latter had not reacted in any sort of way to Frege’s comments. 
Nevertheless, this story doesn’t hold. In fact there was indeed a massive reaction to 
Frege’s critical analysis. This reaction, far from being irrelevant, played a significant 
role in the development of Frege’s anti-psychologistic arguments. The develop-
ment of Frege’s criticism is not a kind of immanent process, but it is also related 
to the disputes between Frege and his contemporaries. Kerry’s criticism of Frege is 
especially important here.
In what follows, I shall structure my exposition around the theses just men-
tioned, following the order above.
The development of Frege’s critique of 
psychologism
It is possible to distinguish four main phases in Frege’s criticism of psychologism:
(a) 1879: Conceptual notation (Beg.)
(b) 1884: The foundations of arithmetic (GAK)
(c) 1893: The basic laws of arithmetic (GGA)
(d) 1918: The thought
(a) In Beg. there are a few passages in which the critique of psychologism 
in logic is based on the distinction between quid-iuris and quid-facti (Frege, 
1971, Beg., p. IX-X p. III-IV). However, psychologism is not a central issue in this 
work. Moreover: If one recognizes the further developments in Frege’s criticism 
of psychologism, then one must admit that by the time he wrote Beg. Frege 
himself was not completely free of psychologism, given the fact that he con-
siders that ideas (Vorstellungen) are the meanings of terms and that judicative 
contents are associations between ideas (Vorstellungsverbindungen) (Frege, 
1971, Beg., § 2, p. 2).
(b) In GA the critique of psychologism is a main topic and the ambiguities 
of Conceptual notation are completely overcome. Among the novelties of 1884 
concerning our current theme, four of them deserve major attention:
•		The critique of psychologism is primarily aimed at psychologist arithmetic 
and numbers, but not at logic.
•		On one hand, the criticism of psychologism in GA is, like the one in Beg., 
associated with the distinction between quaestio facti and quaestio iuris 
(Frege, 1988, GA, p. 6ss, § 26); on the other hand, it points out two new dis-
tinctions which are relevant for the controversy surrounding psychologism: 
(a) the distinction between two different meanings of an idea (Vorstellung) 
(Frege, 1988, GA, § 27); (b) the distinction between what is objective and 
what is real (Frege, 1988, GA, § 26-27).
(c) A decisive step is taken by Frege in GGA. It is common among scholars 
who are not great supporters of Frege’s philosophy (as is the case of Baker and 
Hacker, 1989) to call attention to the fact that there is no conclusive argument 
in Frege’s criticism of psychologism. In a sense, especially when referring to 
GA and GGA, that is correct. However, it is not correct to judge Frege based 
on standards and goals that are alien to him. Is it really the goal of the preface 
of GGA to offer “arguments” against psychologism? If one reads the text care-
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fully, then one sees that Frege is quite clear regarding the goal that wants to 
accomplish: the central focus of Frege’s considerations is a clarification of the 
controversy that tries to set his point of view by opposition to his opponents 
(Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XXV).
Once the correct perspective on how to approach Frege’s text is established, 
its structure becomes clearer. In order to accomplish his main goal, Frege uses a 
regressive procedure in which he gradually deepens the arguments on both sides 
of the dispute until he gets to what one could call the core of the question (Frege, 
1893, GGA, p. XVIII), the end point towards which it leads (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XIX).
This regressive procedure is divided into the following steps:
(i) Frege argues that the differences between his conception of logic and 
that of his opponents derive from different concepts of logical laws (Frege, 1893, 
GGA, p. XIV-XV).
(ii) More precisely: Frege holds that logical laws are laws of Truth (Wahrsein) 
and his opponents hold that they are laws of taking-to-be-true (Fürwahrhalten) 
(Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XV-XVI).
(iii) This disagreement, in turn, derives from the divergence concerning the 
even more essential concept of truth. For Frege, truth is something objective, while 
for the psychologists it is not. They identify truth with being true for every man 
(Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XVI).
(iv) However, the dispute is not limited to the statement or denial of the 
existence of truth, but has to do with the very existence of something objective in 
general, which includes not only truth-value assignments, but also thoughts and 
other logical objects (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XVII). 
(v) More precisely: Frege assumes the existence of a sphere of the non-actual 
objective, which psychologistic logicians deny (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XVIII).
(vi) But why would psychologistic logicians deny the existence of an objective 
sphere? They do so because they ultimately restrict the objective to the actual. Now, 
given that the subjective is just an idea (Vorstellung), the psychologistic logician 
reduces the non-actual to ideas (Vorstellungen), that is, he considers everything that 
is not actual as subjective (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XVIII-XIX, XX, XXI).
(vii) Frege opposes  this reduction. He draws attention to the fact that it is 
not conceptually necessary to identify the concepts of actuality and objectivity.
(viii) So far one gets the impression that the psychologistic logician denies the 
objective, but grants access to the actual. However, it is exactly that which will be 
denied next. The psychologistic logician not only denies the existence of the objec-
tive, but also direct access to the actual (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XX, XXVI).
(ix) If we ask ourselves why this occurs, then we would be compelled to 
see that the psychologistic logician ultimately assumes that the only immediate 
objects given to us are our own ideas (Vorstellungen) (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XX, 
XXI, XXII).
(x) To state that our only objects are our ideas (Vorstellungen) is precisely 
the same as to state the basic thesis of idealism. The conclusion of Frege’s regres-
sive analysis is, therefore, that the psychologistic logician is nothing more than an 
idealist (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XXI).
Now, even though it might seem obvious, it is indeed necessary to ask 
what Frege understands by “idealism”, given that scholars frequently ascribe to 
Frege a conception of idealism that is not his and try to point out insufficiencies 
or confusions in his position based on this false attribution (that, for example, 
is the case of Kenny (1995), Künne (2010) and Mohanty (1989, 2003). Now, the 
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idealism that Frege battles against is not ontological, but epistemological, as he 
explicitly says in some of his writings (for example in Frege, 1980, L (1897), p. 41). 
The latter kind does not deny the reality or existence of something transcendent 
to my ideas, but only states that our ideas are our only direct and immediate 
objects, regardless of whether or not there is an independent reality to which 
these ideas correspond.
In order to determine correctly what Frege understands by “idealism”, as 
well as to understand the importance of its characterization as “epistemologi-
cal”, it is of decisive relevance to look at Erdmann’s text, which Frege takes as 
his direct object of criticism (Erdmann, 1892, Logik, § 3, 11-16, p. 9-16; § 14, 84, 
p. 77-78; § 16, 91, p. 83). In this text it is clear that Erdmann’s main concern is 
to set himself apart from the metaphysical and, especially, the Hegelian idea of 
logic. Logic intends to be ontologically neutral and to deal with thinking in itself 
and its laws, without considering whether or not there is a transcendent reality 
corresponding to it.
In order to prevent future misunderstandings and to put Erdmann’s idealism 
in perspective in the wider context of modern philosophy as a whole, we will, from 
now on, name it “immanence principle” (IP), and we will trace its origins back to 
Descartes and Locke. One should notice that if one considers Erdmann as the ulti-
mate source of Frege’s concept of idealism, then there is no reason whatsoever to 
identify it straight away with either Lockean-Cartesian representationalism or with 
Berkeley’s esse est percipi.
(d) To summarize our argument, it is important to notice that if the re-
construction just made is correct, then the great novelty of “The thought” is 
that, for the first time, Frege does not restrict himself to the mere assumption 
that IP is false, but sets himself the task of rejecting it by means of a reductio 
argument. In other words, just as the idealism criticized by Frege in GGA is an 
epistemological one, the problem of “The thought” is not the Cartesian problem 
of the external world.
The differences between 1884 and 1893  
and the question about their origins
From now on I will leave other possible perspectives aside and direct my at-
tention to the differences between Frege’s criticism of psychologism in 1884 and 
1893, including in the latter, for reasons to be explained, the analysis of texts from 
1894 and 1897.
The differences between GA and GGA can be summarized by four aspects:
(a) As already mentioned, in GGA Frege comes by means of a regressive 
procedure to the conclusion that the IP is the ultimate origin of psychologism. 
That reasoning is new in his thought, and in it lies a decisive difference between 
the criticism of psychologism in GA and GGA. In GGA Frege explicitly states two 
theses: on one hand, he identifies the nucleus of the psychologistic argument in 
the conviction that our only immediate objects are our ideas; on the other hand, he 
opposes this assertion with the statement that we are able to directly apprehend 
objects that are not our ideas. In GA, in turn, Frege assumed that we have access 
to objects that are not our ideas (Frege, 1988, GA, § 93, p. 96). From this assump-
tion it follows indirectly that it is false to claim that we only have access to objects 
that are our ideas. However, that does not mean that he recognized it as being 
the ultimate thesis that lies on the basis of psychologism, which is the axis of his 
regressive argument in GGA.
203
Filosofia Unisinos, 16(3):199-211, sep/dec 2015
The evolution of Frege’s critique of psychologism and the Brentano school
(b) In GA, the problem of psychologism was conceived as a problem essentially 
related to ideal objects and was derived precisely from the ideal nature of these 
objects. In GA, the psychologistic logician is ultimately an empiricist that asserts 
unrestrictedly the rights of sensible knowledge and rejects every epistemological 
claim that goes beyond it. It is precisely because the psychologistic logician of GA is 
an empiricist that he does not question the possibility of knowledge of the external 
world, and it is precisely his empiricism that leads him to consider that everything 
that cannot be apprehended by the senses must be, therefore, an idea. While the 
psychologistic logician criticized by Frege in GA grants without questioning the 
existence of real objects, and also our access to them, something different occurs 
in GGA: here the psychologistic logician, on the basis of one sole reason, not only 
denies the existence of ideal objects, but also questions our access to real objects 
(i.e. the possibility of knowing these objects directly). Summarizing, whereas in GA 
psychologism derives from empiricism, in GGA it comes from idealism.
(c) But the difference between GA and GGA is not a purely quantitative one, 
if by that we mean that in the latter the psychologization of a greater number of 
objects is taken into consideration, i.e. that in GGA the psychologism of ideal objects 
is extended to the real ones. The actual change that occurs between GA and GGA 
concerns the diagnosis of what would be the ultimate source of psychologism and, 
correspondingly, the definition of psychologism itself. Both in GA and in GGA, the 
psychologist “subjectifies” ideal structures. However, if the result in both cases is the 
same, the fundamental reason that leads to this “subjectivization” is different and, 
consequently, the range of the resulting psychologism is different. In GA, numbers 
and the ideal are reduced to ideas because of the refusal to admit the existence of 
the non-real objective; in GGA, it happens because, besides the reason given in GA, 
ideas are our only objects.
(d) Between GA and GGA there is not merely a change, but also a deepening 
of Frege’s standpoint and of his comprehension of the actual differences between 
his views and that of his opponents. The acceptance of the existence of the non-real 
objective is, in GA, the last word in Frege’s position, and the fact that we are able to 
grasp it remains in the background. In GGA, by contrast, it is clear that the distinction 
between the objective and the real does not put an end to the discussion, but instead 
it is viewed only as a provisional step, a crossing point to the future development of 
a process that will ultimately lead to something even more fundamental: the IP. What 
follows from this is that while in GA psychologism is looked upon as a problem related 
to the reductionism of the object, in GGA it is regarded as a problem that springs 
from a false conception of subjectivity. Psychologism in GA is a consequence of the 
denial of the existence of certain objects – the ideal ones – and, in that sense, it is 
an ontological thesis concerning the objects that exist. In GGA, on the other hand, 
psychologism is a consequence of a false conception of subjectivity.
If this analysis is correct, i.e. if there was indeed a significant evolution in 
Frege’s criticism of psychologism between 1884 and 1893, then the question arises 
of whether this evolution occurred as a consequence of a purely immanent devel-
opment of Frege’s thought or there were external influences that played a relevant 
role in it. As I will argue, it seems that the latter answer is the correct one. Frege 
received seven reviews to his GA, among which three approved his anti-psychologist 
stand (Lasswitz, Cantor and Eucken) and three did not (Hoppe, 1885; Husserl, 1992; 
and Kerry, 1887). Hope’s critique is nothing but a dogmatic contraposition of two 
incommensurable points of view; Kerry’s, on the other hand, is philosophically 
substantial and deserves greater attention, for, as we shall see, it is important to 
set   the adequate context for a better understanding of Husserl’s criticism of Frege 
and the latter’s reaction to it.
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Kerry’s criticism of Frege
Kerry’s life and work
Kerry began his academic career as an assistant of the Neo-Kantian Windel-
band. Later on he became close to Brentano. This means that he shifted from the 
transcendental method to the psychological method, from anti-psychologism to the 
claim that a foundation of knowledge by means of a subjective analysis is needed 
(Kerry, 1887, ÜApsV, IV, p. 249).
Kerry sets himself the task of applying the psychological method to the foun-
dations of arithmetic. Now, as for him the allegedly necessary choice between logi-
cism and intuitionism is incomplete, he rejects both. Numbers cannot be grounded 
neither on concepts nor on intuitions, regardless of whether they are empirical or 
pure. On the basis of these assumptions, the question arises of how then numbers 
are given to us. In order to answer that question Kerry builds his theory of “psychic 
work” (psychische Arbeit), whose aim is to explain how objects that are not given 
to us by intuition are, notwithstanding, given to us through activities of conscious-
ness (Bewusstseinstätigkeiten) (Kerry, 1887, ÜApsV, IV, p. 305).  “Psychic work” is 
every “act” that we can execute voluntarily, which is a concept that is actually close 
to Husserl’s “active synthesis” (aktive Synthese). In both cases we have a further 
development of Brentano’s purely structural analysis of intentionality that is oriented 
towards a “constitution theory” (Konstitutionstheorie).
Kerry’s criticism of Frege
Kerry makes four objections to Frege:  
(a) The first one is well-known and concerns the difference between concept 
and object. However, one must have in mind that it is a consequence of the opposi-
tion between the psychological and the logical approaches.
(b) The second one points out the fact that Frege works with a concept of 
logic that is not adequately determined (Kerry, 1887, ÜApsV, IV, p. 261). 
(c) The third objection is an accusation of Frege’s appeal to Reason as the 
faculty capable of apprehending the non-real objective (Frege, 1988, GA, § 26-
27), which, according to Kerry, is nothing more than “to hypostatize a completely 
unarticulated (ungegliedert) faculty as the foundation of objectivity”, something 
that simply does not come to terms with the psychology of the time (Kerry, 1887, 
ÜApsV, p. 305-307). 
(d) The third objection actually is just an aspect of the fourth and more general 
objection, which concerns a radical rejection of Frege’s anti-psychologist struggle. 
Since this objection constitutes our focus at the moment a detailed analysis of it 
will be made in next chapter.
Kerry’s rejection of Frege’s critique of psychologism
In a brief but extremely important section (Kerry, 1887, ÜApsV, IV, p. 305) 
Kerry poses four substantial objections to Frege’s anti-psychologism:
(a) A psychological grounding of logic/mathematics does not necessarily 
imply a threat to objectivity.
205
Filosofia Unisinos, 16(3):199-211, sep/dec 2015
The evolution of Frege’s critique of psychologism and the Brentano school
(b) If the last claim is correct, then Frege’s radical struggle against psychologism 
is unfounded: Frege calls attention to a danger that does not exist. Therefore, his radical 
anti-psychologism must be immediately disqualified as a kind of “horror subjectivi”.
(c) But if, according to Kerry, Frege, on one hand, intends to handle with his 
strict demarcation between logic and psychology a problem that does not exist, 
on the other hand, he fails to see the real difficulty that inevitably emerges in this 
context, that is, the question of how objective validity can arise on the basis of the 
subjective. In order to understand the full meaning of Kerry’s objection we must 
notice the necessity of distinguishing between two possible questions, the first of 
which involves no serious objection, while the second one does.
The first question concerns the relation between the subjective and the ob-
jective in general. The situation is the following: while Frege continues to insist on 
the strict distinction between the subjective and the objective, Kerry requires of him 
the clarification of the positive relation between them. 
But Kerry does not ask Frege to simply “complement” his position, something 
that Frege could have done at will. On the contrary, Kerry wishes to indicate a funda-
mental flaw in his opponent’s thesis, a difficulty that could only be overcome if he 
abandoned his point of view. Given the fact that Frege, in spite of his objectivism, 
cannot avoid answering the question about the apprehension of the objective, this 
should lead him to deny his own thesis, i.e. that one must separate radically the 
objective from the subjective, or, in other words, that one must ground the objec-
tivity of mathematics without any psychological considerations. However, to adopt 
a purely objective path would lead us nowhere. The only possibility of grounding 
is the psychological one, which consists in giving an account of how something 
objective can arise from the subjective. This question cannot be avoided. 
(d) It is obviously not evident to an unprepared reader that Kerry’s reasoning 
can be in any way conclusive. In order for it to become conclusive, one must pay at-
tention to the end of the sentence: “…from which anyhow our knowledge springs…”.
The IP as the fundamental assumption  
of the whole objection
Kerry argues that even if one distinguishes psychology and logic and stresses 
the objective as much as one wants, ultimately the subjective cannot be eliminated, 
since every act of knowledge springs from a subject. In other words:
(a) Knowing necessarily starts with the subjective.
(b) Consequently one cannot avoid giving an explanation of how the objec-
tive arises from the subjective.
(c) For this reason, one cannot maintain a simple distinction between subjec-
tive and objective 
(d) (i.e. insist on a simple distinction between logic/mathematics and psychology),
(e) but one necessarily must eventually call upon the psychological method.
Kerry’s whole reasoning is thus built upon the unproved premise a., which 
is simply assumed to be evident. If this assumption is granted, then Kerry’s argu-
ments are conclusive; on the other hand, if it is not granted, then they become 
incomprehensible.
Let us, therefore, explain the exact meaning of the mentioned premise. In 
order to do that, we first must notice that the opposition subjective-objective, which 
Kerry takes from Frege and with which he works, is equivalent to the opposition 
immanent-transcendent. If we formulate Kerry’s thesis on the basis of the latter  op-
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position, then it becomes even clearer that ultimately the main issue under debate 
is the IP. Kerry’s argument then becomes:
(a) Our only direct and immediate objects are the contents of our conscious-
ness, that is, our ideas.
(b) Thus, the only transcendence that we can talk about is the one that can 
arise from immanence.
(c) Therefore, if one wants to talk about transcendence, one must first explain 
how it arises from immanence.
(d) This is impossible without the use of the psychological method.
(e) Consequently, to simply insist on the radical division between transcen-
dence and immanence is to overlook the actual problem.
Frege’s reaction to Kerry’s criticism
Now that we have shown that Frege’s critique of psychologism faced many 
critical reactions, we will concentrate on the question of how and to which extent 
Frege took these into consideration. In order to do so, we will proceed in two steps.
The struggle against psychologism as the background 
of the dispute over the distinction between  
concept and object
Let us begin with an observation that may not seem obvious: for Frege the 
problem of psychologism constitutes the background of his whole discussion with 
Kerry about the distinction between concept and object.
It is known that Frege lays down three principles in GA. For our present pur-
poses only the first and the third of these are of interest:
(1) “...always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the 
subjective from the objective” (Frege, 1988, GA, p. 10);
(3) “never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object” (Frege, 
1988, GA, p. 10).
At this point, Frege does not establish any relations between the mentioned 
principles. This changes in his Concept and object (Frege, 1966, BG), in which he 
indirectly refers to the relation between them in the following passage: “This seems 
to me all the more necessary, because his opposition [Kerry’s (MAGP)] is at least 
partly based on a misunderstanding, which might be shared by others, of what I say 
about the concept” (Frege, 1966, BG, p. 66-42) and, repeating an argument that 
he had already made in GA, he notes: “The word concept is used in various ways; 
its sense is sometimes psychological, sometimes logical, and sometimes perhaps a 
confused mixture of both”. Kerry is “confusing his own usage of the world concept 
with mine” (Frege, 1966, BG, p. 66-42).
If we now turn our attention from BG to GGA, we then must notice that 
the context in which the criticism of psychologism is introduced in the latter is the 
analysis of the ultimate origin of the resistance the new logic of Beg. must face. This 
origin is found in the interference of psychology in logic and it has as a consequence 
the denial of some essential distinctions that the new logic introduces, besides 
the requirement of other distinctions that are irrelevant to this logic. Amongst the 
fundamental distinctions that are put aside by the insertion of psychological ele-
ments in logic, Frege expressly mentions the one between first and second-order 
predicates, the one between characteristic and property and, last but not least, the 
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one between concept and object (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XIV). Frege returns to this 
very same topic in the criticism of psychologism of the preface of GGA in a passage 
that must be interpreted as a summary of the exposition just made that goes back 
to the starting point (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XXIV).   
Frege’s answer to Kerry
If it is granted that the struggle against psychologism sets the context for 
the concept-object distinction, then the question that naturally arises is whether 
Frege gave an answer to this specific point of Kerry’s critique. It must be noted that 
Frege has never made an explicit reference to this criticism, but maybe he did do 
so implicitly. Even though his name does not appear anywhere in the text, Kerry’s 
presence seems to appear throughout the preface of GGA and also in a relevant 
passage of the 1897 “Logic”.
(a) We have already seen that Frege’s goal in GGA is not to refute psycholo-
gism, but simply to clarify his own position. However, one might wonder why Frege 
thought that it was necessary to elucidate his point of view. In order to answer this 
question, one must remember that Kerry had criticized Frege for not having a clear 
conception of logic. Therefore, one must conclude that Frege wanted to clarify his 
conception of logic and, in order to do so, he contrasted his own conception to 
the rival one, namely, the psychologistic point of view (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XXV).
(b) The fact that Frege sets himself the task of clarifying the dispute in the 
preface of GGA is evident and totally coherent with the way in which the text de-
velops, i.e. with the regressive procedure that we mentioned above.
(c) However, if one looks beyond merely systematic considerations, then one 
sees that it is explicit in Frege’s text that he is indeed concerned with finding the 
ultimate “source of the discussion” (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XVIII), “the end point to-
wards which it leads” (Frege, 1893, GGA, p. XIX). In other words, Frege’s intention 
of bringing the discussion against psychologism to an end is clear, and this end is, 
as we have already seen, no other than the identification of idealism as the ultimate 
source of psychologism, i.e. the acceptance of the IP as a silent and unquestioned 
presupposition upon which Kerry’s criticism is based.
(d) While, on one hand, Frege makes use of a regressive procedure in estab-
lishing the ultimate source of the differences between his position and that of his 
opponents, on the other, he emphasizes that the ultimate consequence of idealism 
is relativism. This may sound strange to a contemporary reader. In fact, one could 
think that the idealist in Frege’s sense is necessarily a relativist. But that is not a 
claim that every supporter of the psychological method, like Brentano and Kerry, 
would easily grant. For this reason, it is one of the main goals of the text to make 
it clear that relativism is an inevitable consequence of the IP (Frege, 1893, GGA, 
p. XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII).
(e) Once concluded, through a purely logic-conceptual reconstruction, that 
it is idealism that lies on the basis of psychologism, Frege alters his goal and, in 
doing so, also changes his modus operandi. He then tries to make clear that the 
described way of thinking is not only the one that is logically the basis of psycholo-
gism, but also the one in which psychologism is actually grounded. This is precisely 
why Frege takes Erdmann as his main target and quotes him in detail. If now we 
ask ourselves for the reasons why it is so important to Frege to prove that Erdmann 
actually operates in the way he describes, we need not speculate greatly about the 
answer, for Frege himself expressly answers the question: he wants to show that 
he is not fighting against windmills (Windmühlen), but rather the danger to which 
he refers is an actual danger. Frege’s way of acting makes total sense if we keep in 
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mind that his background is Kerry’s already mentioned ironic statement that Frege 
suffers from a case of “horror subjectivi”. Frege wants to show thus, concretely 
in Erdmann’s case, that psychologism presupposes idealism and inevitably brings 
relativism along with it.
(f) If we now leave the preface to the GGA and turn our attention to the 
“Logic” of 1897, we must consider a famous passage which is frequently quoted 
as being the irrefutable proof that Frege does not have any kind of interest in 
epistemological questions (and, more generally, in the theory of subjectivity) and 
that he attributes to psychology without any further ado the questions surround-
ing the apprehension of thought (Gedanke) (Frege, 1980, L (1897), p. 63-64). The 
mentioned passage indeed says that, but not only that. When taken out of con-
text, it creates a partial and false impression. It is actually much more complicated 
than it might seem at first sight and contains various other elements, which are 
often overlooked. In a previous section of the text, Frege advocated the thesis that 
thoughts (Gedanken), considered by him as the genuine truth-bearers, cannot be 
psychic entities, i.e. they can be neither ideas nor associations between ideas. Thus, 
Frege considers the following objection: if thoughts cannot be psychic, one must 
at least admit that the apprehension of thoughts is psychic or a “mental process” 
(seelischer Vorgang) (Frege, 1980, L (1897), p. 63-64). In the first place, one must 
insist that from a purely formal perspective there is a serious objection here to Frege’s 
position, which refers to an allegedly unquestionable truth that contradicts the 
starting point of his reasoning. Nevertheless, it is not so easy to understand why it 
is so. In principle, one could think that there is no necessary contradiction between 
the fact that thoughts are not psychic and that their apprehension is. One could 
indeed think that everyone, including Frege, must admit that the apprehension of 
thoughts is a mental process. If, however, the mentioned passage must contain an 
argument, it is because one thinks that the fact that the apprehension of thoughts 
is psychic implies that the thing apprehended must also be psychic. What is as-
sumed here is the following: the act of grasping is psychic and thus nothing can be 
grasped without being psychic itself. But this in itself is not evident. Even though it 
does become evident if one goes further and accepts the claim that the subject can 
only apprehend what exists “in it”, i.e. if we assume the IP to hold. If the objection 
taken into consideration by Frege in the “Logic” of 1897 is considered thus, then 
it becomes clear that it is intimately related to the objection Kerry had directed to 
Frege in 1887. The similarities in content are unquestionable and are expressed even 
at the literal level: Frege says: “aber…. Doch…”; Kerry says: “…doch  jedenfalls…”.
(g) If the objection that Frege posed to himself in the text of 1897 is basically 
the same as the one Kerry had posed to? him, then it becomes even more crucial to 
pay attention to the way in which Frege reacts to it further on in the text. Indeed, 
Frege remarks that even if the process in question is a psychic one, it is located in 
the very limit of the psychic, for in this process there is an element, the thought, 
which is not psychic at all. At first sight it might seem that Frege does not answer 
the objection, but only contrasts it with an assertion that is as dogmatic as the one 
of his opponent: while the latter claims that the grasping of thought is psychic, 
Frege simply denies that it is so. However, this impression is false. Frege definitely 
does not want (nor can) deny that the grasping of a thought is a psychic process. 
What he denies is the claim that, because the process of grasping is a psychic one, 
the thing grasped must also be psychic. The decisive point here is that the thought 
does not have to become psychic just because it is grasped. Therefore, Frege’s re-
sponse consists in the clarification of his opponent’s assumption as such, in order 
to then deny it. Now, if one sets forth the presupposition as such, one eliminates 
the potential problem presented by the opposition.  
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(h) However, Frege not only poses to himself and answers an objection similar 
to Kerry’s, but, in his answer, he reformulates the problem. Correctly formulated, 
the main problem does not consist in explaining how the thought is produced 
(hervorbringen), but in explaining how it is grasped (fassen) (Frege, 1980, L (1897), 
p. 37), i.e. how one can apprehend something transcendent to oneself, that does 
not become immanent by reason of being apprehended, but remains as transcen-
dent as it is in itself. Thus, the problem cannot be how the objective arises from the 
subjective, as Kerry intended, but how a psychological subject grasps something 
that is not his immanent content. Moreover, this problem, says Frege, has not been 
understood in its real difficulty. This is what Frege emphasizes in the footnote in 
which he criticizes the psychology of his time, because it, while trying to derive 
thinking (denken) from ideas, accepts uncritically that the latter are our only objects 
and, thus, ignores the real difficulty of the problem (Frege, 1980, L (1987), p. 64n).
(i) Notwithstanding, if this problem has not been understood in its actual 
difficulty, the problem concerning the way in which the objective arises from the 
subjective is a pseudo-problem: rather than answering the question that it pur-
ports to answer, in a best-case scenario it simply answers the question of how the 
appearance of objectivity arises (Frege, 1980, L (1897), p. 62). Therefore, Frege is 
correcting Kerry’s own question and rephrasing it in the right way.
(j) We say that Frege never gave an explicit answer to Kerry’s criticism. This as-
sertion must be taken with a pinch of salt, corresponding to a final element relevant 
to this context. In a draft of the paper BG there is a passage that did not survive 
until the final version. In it, Frege notes that the ultimate source of the distinction 
between concept and object or characteristic (Merkmal) and property is the disease 
of the time (Zeitkrankheit) that also produces Locke’s sensualism and Berkeley’s 
idealism, that is, the lack of a clear distinction between representing (Vorstellen) 
and thinking (Denken) “strictly speaking” (Frege, 1969, NS, p. 114-115). The point 
I wish to call attention to is that what is ultimately underneath the fact that Frege 
notes the necessity of the mentioned distinction in this context is the rejection of 
the IP. Thinking can be opposed to representing basically because of two reasons: 
either one stresses the abstract character of the former’s object and the intuitive 
character of the latter’s object, or one stresses the dependence or immanence of 
what is represented with respect to the representing and the independence or 
transcendence of the thought with respect to the thinking. Now, there are three 
decisive elements that allow one to affirm that Frege’s distinction is grounded 
on the second opposition and not on the first one, that is, on the one hand, the 
very wording of the passage (which opposes “the objective and the same for all” 
and the “different and subjective”) and, on the other, the fact that only thus one 
can establish a reasonable connection between the failure to distinguish between 
thinking and representing and the confusion that is objected to and, finally, that 
this interpretation is coherent with the historical connections that Frege actually 
establishes with Locke and Berkeley (and not, e.g., with Leibniz). To sum up, Frege’s 
opposition between thinking and representing hinges on the transcendence of 
the former’s object and on the immanence of the latter’s, such that the failure to 
make this distinction would imply that one would lose the transcendence of the 
object of thinking or that it would be restricted to the immanence of the object of 
representation. This text thus anticipates something that Frege will say much more 
clearly some years later when he establishes the notion of a Thought (Gedanke) 
and can, correspondingly, define thinking as the grasping of Thoughts. Here, the 
necessary transcendence of the object of thinking is clearly asserted, even though 
the lack of less equivocal concepts, still expressed by the equivocal term “content” 
(Inhalt, Denkinhalt, Urteilsinhalt), which Frege uses since the Begriffsschrift. But it 
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is precisely the “intermediate” character of the text that allows one to attend to 
the gradual and successive steps that eventually led to Frege’s definitive position, 
which is precisely crystallizing in these middle years.
Husserl’s review of Frege and Frege’s answer
We have already remarked that, if one pays attention to Kerry’s criticism of 
Frege, then one can reach a better understanding both of Husserl’s critiques of Frege 
in the Philosophie der Arithmetik (PhA) and of Frege’s reaction to them, for they are 
aspects of one and the same context. In this point there are six important elements:
(a) In PhA Kerry and Frege are Husserl’s main interlocutors.
(b) Even though Husserl moves away from Kerry in this work, he accepts his 
general program.
(c) Husserl follows Kerry not only in his goal – to apply the psychological 
method to the foundations of arithmetic – but also in the execution of the project 
of a theory of constitution.
(d) But there are numerous similarities not only in the positive projects de-
veloped by Kerry and Husserl (even though the results are not always the same), 
but also in their criticism of Frege1s anti-psychologism, not to mention the ironical 
tone with which they express their criticism: if for Kerry Frege’s fears are unjustified 
and a sign of a “horror subjectivi”, for Husserl they merely point towards “alleg-
edly intrusions” (“vermeintliche Eingriffe”) of psychology in mathematics (Husserl, 
1992, PhA, p. 118).
(e) Precisely because, on one hand, one cannot ignore the systematic simi-
larities between Kerry’s and Husserl’s project and, on the other hand, that both 
authors are in agreement in disregarding Frege’s criticism of psychologism, it is 
likely that Frege understands both of them as an expression of one and the same? 
same tendency, inside which it is irrelevant to distinguish singularities and different 
perspectives.
(f) The latter fact probably explains the sharp reaction by Frege to Husserl’s 
text. After reading Kerry it was clear to Frege from the start which would be the 
end of the story. In that sense, it is not merely by chance that Husserl’s review of 
1894 constitutes a unity with the Preface of GGA and with Frege’s response paper.
(g) Even if one, as is common among Husserl’s supporters, frowns upon Frege’s 
critique of Husserl because it is incapable of handling the nuances and singularities 
of the latter’s position, one must not overlook the fact that Frege focuses only on 
what was essential to his point of view, in order to determine the correct question. 
In 1891, Husserl, just like Kerry and the general tendency of Brentano’s school at 
the time, is still committed to the IP and, therefore, is nothing but a psychologistic 
logician in Frege’s sense (Husserl, 1992, PhA, p. 80).  
Conclusion
The analyses we have carried out make it plausible that Frege tried to handle 
Kerry’s criticism and that in doing so he deepened his own standpoint. Now, we 
straightforwardly admit that our thesis might never be definitely proved. As we have 
already noted, Frege nowhere explicitly takes a stand regarding Kerry’s objections. 
Nevertheless, the contact points are very striking. Actually, the material presented 
provides us with sufficient reasons to believe that reading the psychologistic criti-
cism of Kerry was indeed relevant for Frege, even though he might even have not 
been thinking about Kerry at all when writing the corresponding passages of GGA 
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and of the Logic of 1897, and Kerry was nothing but a catalyst factor for something 
that Frege saw also less sharply present in his other opponents like Husserl. 
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